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1. Overview  
  
 This paper proposes a way to compute the meanings associated with 
sentences with generic noun phrases corresponding to the generalized 
quantifier most. We call these generics specimens and they resemble 
stereotypes or prototypes in lexical semantics. The meanings are viewed as 
logical formulae that can thereafter be interpreted in your favourite models.  
 To do so, we depart significantly from the dominant Fregean view 
with a single untyped universe. Indeed, our proposal adopts type theory with 
some hints from Hilbert ε-calculus (Hilbert, 1922; Avigad and Zach, 2008) 
and from medieval philosophy, see e.g. de Libera (1993, 1996). Our type 
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theoretic analysis bears some resemblance with ongoing work in lexical 
semantics (Asher 2011; Bassac et al. 2010; Moot, Prévot and Retoré 2011).  
 Our model also applies to classical examples involving a class, or a 
generic element of this class, which is not uttered but provided by the 
context. An outcome of this study is that, in the minimalism-contextualism 
debate, see Conrad (2011), if one adopts a type theoretical view, terms 
encode the purely semantic meaning component while their typing is 
pragmatically determined.  
 
2. Type theory as a syntax of semantics.   
 
 In the viewpoint of Montague (1970), a syntactic parse tree is turned 
into a reference, that is a set of truth conditions, or an interpretation in 
possible worlds, via an intermediate step, a logical formula written as a 
lambda term, that one could call a logical form. In Montague’s analysis, 
intermediate steps ought to be wiped off once the computational process 
yielding references is over. Our article is on the contrary focused on this 
logical form and how it can be computed — this step is reminded in Moot 
and Retoré (2012).  What should be the logical formulae depicting the 
meaning? There are several reasons for addressing this question:  
 Firstly, given the subtlety of the questions we wish to consider, 
involving generalised quantification and vagueness, the right notion 
of reference, if any, is going to be tricky.  
 For such issues, it likely that other interpretations, not in terms of 
truth and reference, but in terms of argumentation are better 
designed — for instance, an interactive view of semantics has been 
proposed in Lecomte and Quatrini (2011) using ludics: roughly 
speaking, formulae are interpreted as sets of possible proofs and 
refutations.   
 In order to properly depict an interpretation, be it a referential or an 
interactive one, we first need to know precisely which formulae we 
wish to interpret.  
The logical syntax of semantics is usually split into two systems: 
1. The logic in which we express the logical form, the meaning of the 
sentence, discourse, etc. In Montague semantics it is usually higher 
order predicate logic — although some use first order logic via a 
reification of predicates. This logic is used as a language, which can 
be interpreted in models.  
2. The glue logic, also known as metalogic, is usually presented as a 
lambda calculus — simply typed lambda calculus, in the case of 
Montague.  Via the Curry-Howard isomorphism, well presented in 
Girard et al. (1988), these terms are formal proofs in propositional 
intuitionistic logic with two base types: e for entities and t for 
propositions. This logic is used as a calculus for meaning assembly, 
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since such a view is mainly compositional:  the meaning of the 
whole is a function of the meaning of its parts and of the syntax — 
although context should also be taken into account, as we shall see.  
We adopt a similar viewpoint, but there will be a difference: while there is no 
interplay between the two logical layers in standard Montague semantics, we 
shall have some interaction, because the metalogic is richer:  
1. The logical forms take place into multisorted higher order logic.  
2. The metalogic, the lambda calculus for meaning assembly will be 
second order propositional intuitionistic logic, that is second order 
lambda calculus with many primitive types for entities (we give 
precise definitions of this system in the next section).  
The need for having many primitive types is guided by the following critique 
of Frege’s single sorted universe. We think that language rarely or even never 
quantifies over all entities, but over entities of a given type. Frege used a trick 
to reformulate without types what natural language or even mathematics 
expresses as a:A P(a) with A a type. He writes this as x [A(x)  P(x)]. 
But this formulation is ad hoc, and it does not extend to generalised 
quantification, since the two following propositions, in which   means 
―most‖ are not equivalent:  
 a:A P(a)    Most students go out.  
 x [A(x)  P(x)] For most entities, if they are students they go out.  
This is a reason why the standard approach view generalised quantification as 
a function of two predicates, the restrictor and the predicate itself, see e.g. 
Peters and Westerstahl (2008), Szabolcsi (2010), Mari (2011). Thus the study 
of generalised quantifiers cannot treat quantification as the usual logical 
setting does,  with quantification acting on a single predicate.  
 Our preference for a rather natural quantification over a type (a 
class, a set) rather then for an absolutely universal one is reminiscent of 
medieval philosophy. Indeed, philosophers around Avicenna, in particular his 
student Abu’l-Barakat al-Baghdadi, said that properties should always be 
asserted of an object as being a member of some class (perhaps nowadays 
they would say type), and they draw a distinction between homogenous 
predicates that apply to a class and its subclasses and predicates that apply 
across classes (De Libera, 1993). In comparison with the above formulation 
by Frege, there is quite a difference: not any formula with a single variable 
defines a type, types are much more restricted, and so are comparison classes.  
 If we adopt a type system where not any set is a type, then we shall 
probably want some flexibility, enabling an object of a given type to be 
considered as a member of another type when the context requires such a 
type change. Such transformations require operations on families of types, 
hence a second order type system. Our idea behind this framework is to draw 
a border between semantics and pragmatics: lambda terms compute semantic 
representations and types are irrelevant for computing beta reduction and 
Ch. Retoré / Variable types for meaning assembly 4 
substitutions. The types are used to filter impossible compositions (like ―The 
table shouts‖), and they are often determined the context.  
 Our notion of lexicon introduced in Bassac et al. (2010), and 
extended by Moot and Retoré (2011b) is a rather simple extension of a 
Montagovian lexicon. In addition to the standard lambda term expressing the 
argumental structure of a word, each word is endowed with a finite set of 
lambda terms that allow type transformation in case of solvable type 
mismatch. As an example, let us simply say we provide a correct account of 
sentences like:  
 (1) Liverpool is a poor town and an important harbour.  
 (2) * Liverpool defeated Chelsea and is an important harbour.  
Base types include town, location, people, soccer_team,… and many more, 
since any class that rather naturally comes to mind should be a base type. The 
type town can be converted to any other type in this list, but some 
transformations are declared as exclusive by the lexicon. For instance the 
transformation of a town into a soccer_team is incompatible with the other 
transformation that a town may undergo. [We do not handle examples 
involving phenomena like contrast― The small town of Manning defeated the 
much larger urban school of Davenport by a score of 43-46. » 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manning,_Iowa) nor strong contextualisation 
―Barcelona won four UEFA champions league and organised the Summer 
Olympic Games of 1992‖.]    
 Our model was initially designed to handle meaning transfers in 
compositional lexical semantics and thereafter applied to other questions like 
plurals, or here, quantification and generic NPs. By generic NPs we mean 
expressions that correspond to an implicit or explicit ―most of‖ quantifier:
 (3) Most Lords are appointed by the Queen.  (www.parliament.uk)   
 (4) The Brits love France. (www.brits-in-france.net) [Here we shall only 
consider the reading ―Most Brits love France.‖  while this sentence admits other 
readings: ―Brits prefer France to other countries‖ or ―Brits like France more than 
citizens from other countries do.‖, and possibly others.]  
 Our idea is to consider a generic element corresponding to most, as 
Hilbert x. P(x) and x. P(x) have used to model  existential  and universal 
quantification  (Hilbert 1922, Avigad and Zach, 2008). The universal 
generic x. P(x) is an element such that P(x. P(x)) holds whenever every x 
has the property P. Symmetrically, P(x. P(x)) holds whenever there exists an 
x enjoying the property P. In linguistics, the closest construct is the  of von 
Heusinger (2007), which combines Hilbert’s  with a choice function: it is 
used for picking an element among those that have a given property, when 
there are some. Demonstratives and definite articles behave like this: ―Give 
me the red pen.‖ Context and pragmatic principles have to be used to know 
which element is selected: this choice is left out of the purely semantic 
calculus.  
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3. Metalogic: the system F of variable types 
 
Types are defined from the base type t and many base types for entities, since 
semantics is filtered by type mismatch. A typical mismatch occurs when 
syntax determines application of a predicate ranging over type ei objects to 
type ej objects. We thereafter need some uniform operations applying to all 
types, and the type of such an operation is ―for all type X T[X]‖ : such a 
universal operation can be specialized to any type X. For instance, the 
aforementioned  of von Heusinger could receive the second order type 
 ―for all type X. X‖ that is, for all type X the operator  yields an object of 
type X — see the end of the section for a discussion.  The type  ―for all type 
X. T[X]‖ is written ― X. T[X]‖ — we do  not write ―X. T[X]‖ because we 
also need the usual symbol ―‖ for quantification in the logical form. This 
second-order lambda-calculus called system F, was introduced by Girard 
(1971), but a good and freely available reference is Girard et al. (1988).   
Types are defined as the elements of the smallest set containing:  
 Base types, that are t and ej (a finite but large set of entity classes, 
which can be viewed as some linguistic ontology)  
 Type variables (variables ranging over types) denoted by upper case 
letters Xi (a countable number of them is required, as usual with 
variables) 
The set of types is closed under the following operations:  
 Whenever T1 and T2 are types, T1T2 is a type as well. This type 
represents functions that map T1 objects into T2 objects. The type 
that we write T1T2 is sometimes written <T1,T2> in the 
Montagovian literature.  
 Whenever X is a type variable and T a type, X. T is a type — 
usually T depends on X.  
The usual Montagovian system uses simply-typed lambda-calculus, which, 
via the Curry-Howard isomorphism — see e.g. Girard et al. (1988)  — 
corresponds to intuitionistic propositional logic with two base propositions, e 
and t and implication  as the only connective.  In our model, one may 
quantify over propositional variables. The corresponding logic is 
intuitionistic second order propositional logic with implication and universal 
quantification in which other connectives can be encoded such as existential 
quantification, conjunction and disjunction.  
 The terms typed within this type system can be viewed, by the 
Curry-Howard isomorphism, as proofs in intuitionistic second order 
propositional logic. They are defined as follows where both expressions 
―t:U‖ and ―tU‖ denote a term ―t‖ of type ―U‖.   
Firstly, terms include variables and constants:    
 For every type, we have a finite and possibly empty set of constants: 
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o  Some of them correspond to constants of the semantic 
language for logical forms (proper names, predicates, 
higher order predicates, …). For instance, one could have a 
constant love of type Animated → e → t 
o Some of them correspond to logical operations 
(connectives, quantifiers etc.).  
 For every type we have a countable set of variables of this type. 
The set of terms is the smallest set containing the variables and constants 
above that is closed under the following operations:  
 Whenever f is a term of type TU and t a term of type T, the 
expression (f t) which reads ―f applied to t‖ is a term of type T.  
 Whenever u is a term of type U and x a variable of type T, the 
expression x. u is a term of type TU.  It denotes ―the function 
that maps x to u‖.  
 Whenever t is a term of type X. T and A is a type, the expression 
t{A}, ―t applied to the type A‖, or ―t specialised to the type A‖, is a 
term of type T[X:=A], that is the type T in which any occurrence of 
the type variable X is replaced with the type A.  
 Whenever t is a term of type T and X a type variable not appearing in 
the type of any free variable in t, the expression X. t is a term of 
type X. T ―the generalisation of t (in X)‖.  
This definition warrants a few comments.  
 A term u with a universally quantified type X. T may be viewed as 
a generic term, or a universal term, which can be specialised to a 
type A, by application of u to a type A, written u{A}.  
 As one can see, there is a restriction in the generalisation rule. This 
restriction means that, if in t we are assuming some properties of X, 
then we cannot generalise t to all types X:  the presence of a free 
variable whose type involves X precisely expresses that we are 
assuming that some specific properties of the type X hold.   
 Observe that the rules for specialisation and generalisation look a lot 
like the usual lambda calculus rules for application and abstraction.  
If one thinks of types as propositions and of terms of type P as proofs of P, as 
the Curry-Howard isomorphism allows, to which deductive system does this 
lambda calculus correspond? We have propositional constants, and 
propositional variables and the only connective is the implication ―‖  
together with the universal quantifier over propositional variables ―‖: 
specialisation and generalisation are respectively the quantifier elimination 
and introduction rules. From these two connectives, one can define 
conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification over propositional 
variables, see e.g. Girard et al. (1988). Since there is no classical axiom like 
tertium non datur, it is an intuitionistic sytem. Hence, while the metalogic 
behind standard Montague semantics is propositional intuitionistic logic with 
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arrow as the only connective, here the meta logic is quantified propositional 
intuitionistic logic — in which the other connectives and second order 
existential quantification can be encoded.  
 As in the usual Montagovian setting, only closed normal terms of 
type t correspond to semantic representations, which are logical formulae. 
Here as well, we need some reduction rules which compute semantic 
representations, i.e. formulae, by substituting types for type-variables, and 
terms for variables.  The two reduction rules are very similar: one of them is 
standard beta reduction and the other is more or less the same, but on type 
variables and types.  
1. ((xA. tB) uA) reduces to t[x:=u],  that is t in which any occurrence of 
x is replaced by the term u. Observe that necessarily x and u are of 
the same type A, and that the type B of the whole term is preserved 
under reduction.  
2. (X.tT){A} reduces to t[X:=A], that is t in which any occurrence of 
the type variable X is replaced with the type A. Observe that the type 
of the term, T[X:=A], is preserved under reduction.  
System F may seem a bit unsafe at first glance. Indeed we are defining the 
type X.T[X] from all the types T[X] with X ranging over all types, 
including X=X.T[X] which yields T[X.T[X]], and one may fear this 
impredicativity. However system F does not collapse. A first argument is that 
it is possible to construct a model, coherence spaces - see e.g. Girard et al. 
(1988) - with types as structured sets and proofs/terms as particular objects of 
these structured sets. Another argument shows that there is no collapse and 
will be useful to us thereafter: the terms of system F enjoy a strong 
normalisation, a confluent one yielding a unique normal form however one 
proceeds  (Girard, 1971). This shows system F is safe: if there were a 
collapse, or proof of something false, then there would be a normal one, and 
given the shape of normal terms/proofs it is easily seen that there cannot 
exists such a term/proof.  
 
4. The lexicon and the logic of semantic representations  
 
 The metalogic is second order propositional intuitionistic logic a.k.a. 
second order lambda calculus, but in which logic are we going to express the 
meaning of sentences? Actually, we do not depart much from the standard 
Montagovian approach.  We use higher order logic but a multisorted one: 
indeed, we have several base types for entities with relations among them. 
These relations between types are encoded by functions mapping one type to 
another and they represent meaning transfers that are reminiscent of Nunberg 
(1995). Here as well, both the argument and the predicate can contribute to 
the transfer of meaning, but the main difference is that we integrate these 
meaning transfers into a broader compositional type-theoretic framework, 
Ch. Retoré / Variable types for meaning assembly 8 
fully formalized and with an explicit computational mechanism — this lead 
us to some schematic model, leaving out some semantic subtleties.  
 An entry in the lexicon associates to each word a main lambda-term, 
that of standard Montague semantics, within a richer type system. But there 
might be other lambda terms for turning objects of a given type into the same 
object considered as a member of some other type. For instance a book is of 
type Book, but it can be turned into a material thing that can be heavy, or into 
contents that may be interesting. Ontological inclusions like Cars into 
Vehicles are also encoded that way. In order to block infelicitous 
compositions like ―The table barks‖, we have many base types, and the 
argument of ―barks‖ should be of type ―Dogs‖. But these type constraints 
should also be relaxed to allow composition of sentences like  ―I am parked 
in front of building 20‖ — both the predicate/function and the argument can 
provide the transfer. Finally, some meaning transfers are irreversible, and 
block other possible transformations: once a town has been understood as a 
soccer team, it cannot be considered as a location or as its major.  
 In order to illustrate the kind of operations such a system is able to 
model, let us see how we can conjoin two predicates that apply to different 
kinds of objects, like heavy and interesting which respectively apply to 
material things (M) and to abstract contents (A). This conjunction can only 
be considered if an object can be viewed both as a material thing and as an 
abstract content, as books (B) can.  Given  
 two predicates, h of type Mt and i of type At,  
 two maps, m from a type B to M and a from B to A,  
 b of type B 
the conjunct can be expressed as (h (m b)) and (i (a b)) or rather, using 
lambda calculus prefix notation, as  
(and (h (m b))) (i (a b)) 
In this expression, ―and‖ of type t(tt) is the standard conjunction of two 
propositions. As we are able to do so in any such situation, the lambda term 
AND for the word ―and‖ in a sentence like  
 (5) This book is heavy and interesting. 
is  
AND: A M iA→thM→t B bB aB→AmB→M  
(and
t→(t→t)
 (h (m b))) (i (a b)) 
Observe that the variables whose type contains a type variable X are bound 
before quantifying over the type-variable X. The functions a and m from the 
type B (book in our example) to, respectively, the types A and M are provided 
by the entry book in the lexicon. With the strength of second order 
quantification, a single term is enough, since this single term can be 
specialised to the types of the situation under consideration. For our book 
example, AND should be successively applied to the following five terms 
and three types in this order:  
AND {Abstract}{Material} 
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 interesting
Abstract→t
heavy
Material→t
 
  {Book}  
   this_book
Book 
to_contents
Book→A
 to_material
Book→M 
Another example, for the syntax of semantics, is the modelling of the 
universal quantifier . In an unsorted logic, one only needs a single 
quantifier for individuals, which from the viewpoint of lambda calculus is a 
constant of type ((et)t) and others for higher order quantifications, e.g. 
(((e(et))t)t) for quantifying over transitive verbs. Using system F, a 
single constant for universal quantification is needed. A single constant  of 
type X. (Xt)t is enough since it can be specialised to a type U if one 
wants to quantify over U-objects by specialisation to U. Indeed, the term 
( {U}) is of type (Ut)t and ( {U}) represents universal quantification 
over U-objects. The same consideration applies to von Heusinger’s . We 
said its type should be X. X but we should also have a constant  receive the 
type X. (Xt)X, which when applied to a property of X yields an element 
of type X enjoying the property P.  
 
5. Some questions on this computational model of semantics 
 
 This reorganisation of compositional semantics and of lexical 
semantics deserves some comments. Firstly one should really make a 
distinction between the metalogic, quantified propositional intuitionistic 
logic, where the proofs/terms are relevant objects, and the logic of semantic 
representations, higher order multisorted logic, where only the formulae are 
relevant. But, in our model, there is an unusual interplay between them: for 
any judgement ―u is of type P‖ i.e. u:P one can consider a predicate P and 
state as an axiom the formula P(u). On the other hand, not any formula with a 
single variable defines a type: types are much more constrained, and from an 
intuitive viewpoint, they should correspond to cognitively accessible classes.  
 A frequently asked question about our model is whether it has 
something to say about subtyping. Indeed, it is known that, despite some 
attempts by Cardelli et al. (1994) and by Soloviev and Luo (2000), 
―subtyping‖ does not get along well with second order typing. Firstly, one 
should draw a strong difference between the semantic notion of subtyping 
and the technical notion of ―subtyping‖ in typed functional programming  — 
remember that system F and similar lambda calculi can be viewed as 
functional programming languages, so the confusion is possible. Subtyping in 
functional programming is supposed to fit in with the functional types: the 
subtypes of AB should be inferred form the subtypes of A and those of B.  
Do the linguistic subtypes of eating verbs food  human  t derive from the 
subtypes of food and of human beings? We think that manners are more 
relevant for classifying eating verbs than the nature of their subjects and 
objects. Furthermore, it is likely that the linguistic IS_A relation is 
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idiosyncratic and much more constrained than the real world ontological 
relations.  
 There exist alternative solutions to our proposal for handling both 
compositional and lexical semantics and pragmatics: the one by Asher 
(2011), using categorical logic, and the one by Luo (2011) using type theory. 
Although such type theories are weaker as logical systems, because they do 
not allow quantification over any type, these type theories have many 
structure-building rules, many reduction rules, and many variants. The 
structures they offer for linguistic modelling can be encoded in system F, 
except dependent types: if the only dependent types one needs are just 
records, they are already present in system F, but if real dependent types are 
absolutely needed — this is questionable  — dependent types can safely be 
added to system F, since all of this is included in the calculus of constructions 
of Coquand and Huet (1988)— see e.g. Bertot and Castéran (2004).  
 The system F also raises complexity issues, in particular for typing a 
given pure lambda term, or because it contains functions requiring an 
exponential number of reductions to compute their results. Our model does 
not have to face these issues. Indeed, we only reduce terms that are obtained 
by inserting lambda terms from the lexicon into a syntactic tree: there are 
neither problematic functions in the lexicon, nor in the syntactic tree/term, 
and we never try to compute the type of an untyped lambda term. There can 
be several choices of meaning transfers in case of type mismatch, but this is 
just the unavoidable syntactic, semantic and pragmatic ambiguity of human 
languages.  
 
6.  A logical syntax for generics introduced by “most” 
 
 Although there is not a clear cut-off between the two constructions, 
following English usage see e.g. the Grammar quizzes by Sevastopoulos 
(2012), we make a distinction between noun phrases introduced by ―most‖ 
and those introduced by ―most of‖. Indeed, while the class associated with 
the ―most‖ object is natural and immediately apprehended, the class 
associated with the ―most of‖ object may be a complex one, defined by a 
formula.  
 (7) Most students passed logic.  
 (8) Most of the students that passed logic passed algebra.  
 (9) Most of the students went to the university party.  
Observing (7) and (8) one has the feeling that the ―most of the‖ construction 
may apply to any class defined by a complex property of one entity, while the 
plain ―most‖ applies to a natural class. This impression is confirmed by 
comparing (7) and (9): in (9) one has the impression that word ―student‖ is 
used as a property of entities of a wider class, e.g. a class including students, 
professors, administration… The distinction will be reflected in our system 
by the distinction between types and formulae with a single free variable.  
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6.1. The logical syntax of bare “most” generics 
  
 Our idea is that ―most‖ always refers to a type and not to any set that 
could be defined by a formula with a free variable using the comprehension 
scheme: this is the ―most_of_the‖ quantification. Consequently, combining 
our treatment of quantification, a single quantifier which can specialised to 
any type, and generic elements like the  and  of Hilbert (1922) and the  of 
von Heusinger (2007), we propose to use a constant ―‖, read as specimen 
of, of type X. X. As von Heusinger’s  whenever it is applied to a type A it 
yields the specimen in A: {A} is of type A. Using predicate logic rather than 
type theory, if A were a property, that is a unary predicate, this would be 
written x. A(x) in the style of von Heusinger’s .  
 As opposed to the work on generalized quantifiers (see Keenan, 
Peters and Westerstahl) the generalised quantifier is defined from a single 
predicate/type A, and not as a function of two predicates: we only use the 
first of them, which is assumed to be a type in the bare ―most‖ case.  
 Let us come back to the standard examples and compute the 
readings. A syntactic analysis, e.g. a categorial one, of example  
(4) ―The Brits love France.‖ will yield the linear lambda term:  
((loves France) (the Brits)) — syntactically the verb is first applied to its 
object and then to its subject.  Firstly, observe that despite the quantifier, 
there is no need for type raising. Indeed, the Brits will be a virtual element of 
type Brit, which is a subset of Human_beings which is itself a subset of 
Animals which are the right class for subjects of the binary predicate love. 
There is no need to restrain the object of the binary predicate love.   Hence 
the lexicon, within the entry Brits, provides two morphisms h of type Brits → 
Humans and a of type Human → Animals. These transformations, which are 
just type inclusions encoding the subtyping relations, are quite particular and 
transparent: hence it is possible to have a general rule saying that whenever a 
function applies to a type then it applies to any type included in it, without 
writing the transformation(s), and this amounts to having as many functions 
―love‖ as there are subtypes of its arguments. Thus the term denoting the 
semantic representation before reduction is either 
(λy λx loves x y) France (a(h({Brits})))  
which is well typed, and which reduce to the lambda term  
(loves (a(h({Brits} )))) France   
— with implicit type inclusion the first term would be (λy λx loves x y) 
({Brits}) France, and the reduced one would be (loves ({Brits} )) France.  
 The constant ―‖ is the lambda term associated with the, meaning 
most of and this term produces the specimen associated with the Brits — it 
does not prevent the from having other behaviours meaning a definite set, 
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―all the‖… etc. Other examples introduced by ―most‖ are handled exactly the 
same way. Now let us turn our attention to generics introduced by ―most of 
the‖ with an NP thereafter.  
 
 
6.2. The logical syntax of “most of the” generics 
  
For processing an example like (8), the model is quite similar, but the 
constant  to be used has a slightly different type: : X. (Xt)X. This 
constant  takes a property of X-objects, and returns the specimen of the 
corresponding subset of X. Assume a categorial analysis with words replaced 
by their semantic lambda-terms yields:  
passed((x:student passed(x,logic)),topology). 
Letting s be a shorthand for the ―most of the‖ generic i.e. s=(x:student 
passed(x,logic)), the typing ensures that s is of type student, but it is a bit 
tricky, in plain lambda calculus, to also get the information passed(s,logic) 
and to produce, as final semantic representation, passed(s,logic) and 
passed(s,topology). It would be much more convenient in the lambda DRT of 
Muskens (1996). This is the way semantics is implemented in the categorial 
parser of Moot, see e.g Moot et al. (2011), but an explanation of lambda DRT 
would be too lengthy to be included in this paper.  
 
7. A word on interpreting the generic element  
 
 Although we said earlier that we do not yet have any proper 
interpretation of the specimen of a type, let us say a word about the reference 
of this generic element, that is its truth conditions, and thereafter on its 
possible interpretation in interactive terms, that is its proof theoretical usage.  
 
7.1. When is “most of the A are B” true?   
 
 Firstly, as opposed to some of the literature, but in accordance with 
Solt (2009), we strongly assert that ―most‖ is much more than ―the majority 
of the‖. For instance, after an election won with 53% against 47% of the vote, 
one cannot say that most of the electors voted for the first winner. ―Most‖ is a 
vague quantifier and starts to be true from a percentage that varies according 
to the class and the predicate. Possibly ―70%‖ is enough to say that most 
students contracted the flu, but at the same time ―70%‖ is not enough to 
assert that most of the students passed the exam.  
 Secondly, as opposed to what is said by most of (!) the literature, it 
has little to do with cardinality but rather concerns measure, and our 
apprehension of the class, which can be infinite. For instance, one can find, 
even in advanced maths books the statement ―most numbers are not prime‖ 
(An invitation to modern number theory, by Steven J. Miller and Ramin 
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Takloo-Bighash). What does that mean? It is known from the Ancient Greek 
mathematicians that there are as many numbers as there are prime numbers. 
We need to consider a measure for the whole class and consider that the 
measure of the relevant subset is a large percentage of the measure of the 
whole or to consider that the limit of some cognitive perception of the class: 
the statement on prime numbers simply means that 0 is the limit of the 
proportion of prime numbers between 0 and n when n approaches infinity. A 
natural notion of measure is the usual mathematical notion of measure used 
in probability theory. It also applies to infinite sets, and makes it possible to 
consider limits, to have subsets with the same cardinal but with different 
measures,... as natural language does.   
 Given our choice to handle ―most of‖ quantification by considering a 
generic element, we would like to say which properties are true of the 
specimen of A.   An answer is that the specimen enjoys all the properties P 
that are true of most As, ―most‖ being defined by the appropriate measure on 
the type A — and a percentage depending on A and on P. Given that it is 
never the case that both a property and its negation are true of most of the A, 
there should not be any contradiction. Because of the duality between 
properties and individuals, it would be pleasant to also have a measure on the 
set of predicates that are functions to truth-values. This is mathematically 
possible, since whenever a set is endowed with a measure, the set of 
functions from this set to another set can be endowed with a measure as well, 
as some construction by Kolmogorov shows. 
 Regarding scalar functions like height, weight, etc. we would prefer 
to replace the function by a relation, and to allow the generic element to have 
a full interval of values rather than a single value.  Hence the height of the 
specimen can be any value in a given interval — an example of such a 
situation is provided by baby weight and height charts. The idea is that a 
function  ―tall‖ means taller than common values, the common values being 
the ones associated to the specimen, the ones of ―most of‖ the individuals in 
the relevant class. But it might be trickier than that.  In some species, males 
are taller than females. There should be no problem to have a height chart for 
males, one for females, but what about the size of a specimen of this species 
without specifying its sex? One could say that the interval goes from the 
minimum of the female height interval to the maximum of the male height, 
but possibly the first value has to be increased and the second one decreased.  
This is just an intuition that requires further study, with some inspiration 
from the work of Egré and Klinedinst (2011) and Bale (2011). Our proposal 
is possibly quite close to the PhD thesis of Solt (2009) that we discovered 
very recently. As one can see, this is just a proposal, and we are far from a 
neat answer.  
 
7.2. Interactive models, proofs and refutations 
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 Given the complexity of the definition of truth for a sentence 
involving a vague quantifier, one may adopt a more pragmatic answer: what 
are the situations, contexts in which such a ―most of‖ statement can be 
asserted? On the formal side, this leads us to think about the other side of 
logic, namely proofs. Of course we do not have a complete sets of rules, but 
still we know some correct ways of reasoning with such a notion. Firstly, 
when a property is true of all individuals, it is true of ―most of‖ them, 
although because of Gricean maxims we do not say ―most of‖ when we can 
say ―all‖. We also know that when a property P is true of ―most‖ As there is 
an A satisfying P — with some precaution about empty models and 
conditionals with an ironic reading: ―if Brits do not like France, I am the 
pope‖.  
 Finding rules for ―most‖ can be split into two already difficult 
questions: 
1. Defining rules for proportional quantifiers (―the majority of‖, ―more 
than 30%‖, etc.).  
2. Adapting such rules for an undetermined large or small proportion.  
―The majority of‖ is in some sense self-dual: one asserts it because P holds of 
more than 50%, but a way to refute it is to find another property Q, which 
also holds of more than 50% but which does not intersect P. The same holds 
for X% and  (100-X)% quantifiers. This, together with our view of ―most‖ as 
acting on a single type, as universal and existential quantifications, suggests 
that generalized quantifiers apply to predicate and not to sets of individual. In 
our view, the fact that most A are P is rather a property of P than a property 
of the elements in A.  
 We must admit that, for the time being, we can only propose a 
direction for further investigations. Our proposal is as frustrating as the 
current literature with tableau rules: monotonicity principles define rules, 
―tertium non datur Xv~X for all X‖ is the axiom, but tableau rules are also far 
from complete: nothing distinguishes two quantifiers with the same 
monotonicity properties, except the models, if they are allowed to intervene 
inside the rules, which is not so satisfactory, see e.g. Peters and Westerstahl 
(2008).  
 Thus the interpretation of the generic elements is an open question, 
but at least we have a neat syntax for them and know which formulae we 
want to interpret and how they are obtained from syntactic parse trees, and 
there exist fine-grained presentations of the linguistic aspects of 
quantification like Mari (2011) and Szabolcsi (2010).   
 
8. On the debate between semantic minimalism and contextualism 
 
We actually started our reflection on generics from classical examples 
in the minimalism-contextualism debate. These examples are statements that 
can be both true and false depending on the class in which the object is 
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considered, which is provided by the context. For instance, if Carlotta is a 
two-year old girl, depending on her class – her type in our type theoretic 
framework — the following statement can be both true and false:   
 (7) Carlotta is tall. 
 (8) My daughter is tall and thin for a 2 year old, but she is following her 
  curve.‖    (http://mom4mom.com) 
 (9 ) My two-year-old can't get his own cup out of the cabinet because he 
  can't reach, …( http://633woman.com) 
We noticed that the specimen notion together with the flexibility of 
second-order typing succeeds in capturing this phenomenon. As said above, 
entries in the lexicon contain optional λ -terms that encode the ontological 
relations and in the case of a two-year old girl like Carlotta, she can be 
viewed as a child, and also as a female human being, as a human being etc. 
Here are the constants and the useful lexicon entries:  
 float=type for real numbers 
 height : Πα . (α → float → t) height is a binary predicate 
 <: float→float→t 
 Carlotta  
o Carlotta : 2yoGirl (constant) 
o h : 2yoGirl → human (optional λ -term)  
 tall  
o Λαλx:α 
∀{float}λh:float  
∀{float}λhs:float height{α}({α},hs)∧ height{α}(x,h) 
⇒ hs ≤ h 
o type of tall: Πα.α →t 
The constant height is a relation between members of a type and 
numbers (float), and numbers are compared with <. The entry for tall applies 
to any type T (second order is quite important here as well) and to a term u of 
type T. It says that the object u is taller than any possible height of the 
specimen of this class T. 
If we do not use any optional λ-term, we apply the lambda term 
associated to tall to the type 2yoGirl, and to the constant Carlotta2yoGirl we 
get the reading where Carlotta is taller than the maximal height of the 
2yoGirl specimen (think again of baby height charts). This is likely to be 
interpreted as true. 
But if we apply ―tall‖ to the human type, we cannot apply the result to 
the constant Carlotta:2yoGirl. But we can firstly apply the h : 2yoGirl → 
human (optional λ -term) to the constant Carlotta:2yoGirl and proceed: using 
the type human since h(Carlotta) is of type human. We thus obtain the 
formula meaning that Carlotta is tall as a human being, which is unlikely to 
be interpreted as true. 
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The semantic machinery produces every possible reading and the 
context intervenes as a preference for some optional transformation(s). It 
should be discussed whether there are one or several natural types for an 
object. Our model can handle any solution: a single natural type, several 
privileged types... — quite often, such ontological or metaphysical questions 
spontaneously pop up when dealing with the organization of the concepts in 
the lexicon.  
This case shows a general idea underlying our model: terms represent 
the computational process for obtaining semantic representations, while types 
that are flexible are pragmatically inferred from the context. This could be 
called a type-theoretic viewpoint in the debate between contextualism and 
semantic minimalism.  
 
9. Conclusion  
 
 We presented a type-theoretic framework for the logical syntax of 
lexical and compositional semantics, and we focused on its use for ―most‖ 
quantifiers, depicted via the corresponding generic elements that we called 
specimens. This strongly relies on the second order lambda calculus, with 
flexible types, as the right framework for meaning assembly. 
 Along the way we were able to have a viewpoint on the border 
between semantics and pragmatics. Formally, semantics is carried out by the 
terms, while pragmatics provides the types: types do not drive the 
computation but they filter impossible readings and sometimes trigger 
alternative readings by changing the type, hence the comparison class.  
 This work has been implemented by Richard Moot as part of a large 
lexicalised categorical French grammar producing semantic representations 
as Discourse Representation Structure with lambda-DRT (Moot et al. 
(2011)). The semantic representations are expressed in a multi-sorted first-
order logic — instead of multi-sorted higher order as we did here.  
 Delimiting the syntactic part of semantics - finding the proper 
logical syntax for compositional semantics - yields more questions than it 
solves... At least it makes the questions clear: how to interpret the semantic 
representations, the logical formulae associated with sentences involving 
―most‖ quantifiers. Two directions are possible. The standard one, for which 
we should determine the truth of a statement involving the specimen, the 
generic of ―most‖: this seems to be hardly tractable. The other direction, in 
the proof theoretical tradition, would be to find rules for asserting and 
refuting sentences involving specimens. Although we shall possibly never 
find the complete set of rules, we can hope to find convincing subsets by 
viewing quantification as acting on predicates and not on individuals.  
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